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STUDENT NOTE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION WHERE INJURY RESULTS
FROM EXPOSURE TO THE NATURAL ELEMENTS
It is the purpose of modern workmen's compensation statutes to
give the employee protection from risks connected with his employ-
ment.' The employer is charged with certain injuries to his workmen
without regard to negligence.1 Workmen's compensation is thus a form
of strict liability-a liability limited, however, by the statutes which pro-
vide almost uniformly that an award shall be made only when there has
been an injury which arises out of and in the course of the employment.8
As a further limitation, except in states allowing compensation for occu-
pational diseases, it is generally required by statute, either expressly or
as construed, that the injury to be compensable must be accidental. 4
1 1 SGHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (3d ed. 1941) §3.
2 HOROWITZ, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1944) 7.
I Brown, Arising Out of and in the Course of the Employment in Workmen's
Compensation Acts (1931) 7 Wis. L. REv. 15, 67; Note (1931) 15 MINN. L.
REv. 742.
4 For a collection of cases, see (1935) 71 C. J. 562.
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The West Virginia statute5 merely states that disbursements shall be al-
lowed for personal injuries occurring in the course of and resulting from
the employment, but the phrase personal injuries has been interpreted
to include only injuries of accidental origin.' An accident has been judi-
cially defined as a sudden event, unexpected on the part of the work-
man, and capable of being localized at a definite time and place, as dis-
tinguished from an injury occurring gradually within the course of the
employment.7 Thus, injuries caused by the natural elements are com-
pensable if attributable to a specific and definite event, provided they
occur in the course of and arise out of the employment.8
The words "in the course of" and "arise out of" the employment
contain two distinct propositions, the first relating to whether the em-
ployee is actually engaged in his employment at the time of the accident
and the second relating to the causative act which occasions the injury.
In order that compensation may be due, the injury must both arise out
of and be received in the course of the employment. Neither alone is
sufficient.9 However, courts construing the statutes have had much dif-
ficulty in ascertaining the meaning of the requirement that the injury
arise out of the employment.1 0
In the case of In re McNichol,4" the Massachusetts court said that if
the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work
and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the
whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of
the employment, then it arises out of the employment. It excludes an
injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contribu-
tory proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the work-
men would have been exposed apart from the employment. The court
thus finds a standard of liability by borrowing the doctrine of proximate
5 W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1943) c. 23, art. 4, §1.
6 Lockhard v. Compensation Comm'r, 115 W. Va. 144, 174 S. E. 780 (1934);
Jones v. Rhinehard & Dennis, 113 W. Va. 414, 168 S. E. 482 (1933); Conley v.
Compensation Comm'r, 107 W. Va. 546, 149 S. E. 666 (1929).
7 A. Carbone & Co. v. McGregor, 113 Colo. 241, 155 P. (2d) 994 (1945);
Tallahassee v. Roberts, 155 Fla. 815, 21 So. (2d) 712 (1945); Knapp v. State
Industrial Comm., 195 Okla. 56, 154 P. (2d) 964 (1945).
S General Properties Co. v. Greening, 154 Fla. 814, 18 So. (2d) 908 (1944);
McClain v. Travelers Ins. Co., 71 Ga. App. 659, 31 S. E. (2d) 830 (1945);
Maynard v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 144 Ohio St. 22, 56 N. E. (2d) 195 (1944).
9 Archibald v. Workman's Compensation Comm'r, 77 W. Va. 448, 87 S. E.
791 (1916); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Thornton, 72 Ga. App. 48,
32 S. E. (2d) 816 (1945); Staten v. Long-Turner Const. Co., 185 S. W. (2d)
375 (Mo. App. 1945); Grimes v. Janney-Marshall Co., 183 Va. 317, 32 S. B.
(2d) 76 (1945).
10 See, e.g., Kansas City Fibre Box Co. v. Connell, 5 F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A.
8th, 1925); cf. (1921) 28 R. C. L. 796, (setting forth some of the conflict and
uncertainty in the interpretation of "arising out of" the employment).
11215 Mass. 497, 102 N. E. 697 (1915).
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cause from the law of negligence, but along with it it brings the tangle
of legal confusion which surrounds that phrase. It is seldom that the
employment cannot be considered a substantial factor in bringing about
an injury, for without his employment the workman would not be pres-
ent at the time when and place where the injury occurred,1 2 but it is gen-
erally held that it is not enough to qualify the employee for compensa-
tion that his injury occurred in the course of his employment. 13 To be
compensable the injury must result from a hazard which is recognized as
inherent in the nature of the work as distinct from the general risks of
life.1 4 Application of this rule as a guide for the grant of an award for
injuries resulting from natural forces has been perplexing. An injury is
classified as resulting from a natural force when it happens by the direct
and immediate operation of the forces of nature uninfluenced by human
intervention, and is of such character that it could not have been pre-
vented by reasonable diligence." Risks of injury from natural forces are,
in general, risks to which the public as a whole is exposed. If the rule
that the risk be inherent in the work is to be satisfied, it must be shown
that the employment adds to the risk of injury from such source.'0
Hence, as a requisite for the recovery of compensation, the great major-
ity of courts require a showing that the employee by reason of his duties
was exposed to the natural force causing his injury to a greater degree
than members of the general public. 17 Guided by this standard, compen-
sation has been allowed for injuries resulting from cyclones and torna-
does,' 8 earthquakes, 19 freezing,20 sunstroke, 2' and lightning,2 when the
12 Cf. Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U. S. 400 (1919); Matter of
Kowalec v. New York Consol. R. R., 229 N. Y. 489, 128 N. E. 888 (1920); Carey
v. Industrial Comm., 181 Wis. 253, 194 N. W. 339 (1923).
1" Abell Chevrolet Co. v. Industrial Comm., 370 Ill. 460, 19 N. E. (2d) 361
(1939); Fassig v. State, 95 Ohio St. 232, 116 N. E. 104 (1917); Ellington
Lumber Co. v. Industrial Comm., 168 Wis. 227, 169 N. W. 568 (1918). Contra:
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Industrial Comm., 81 Colo. 233, 254 Pac. 995 (1927) ;
Ciocca v. National Sugar Refining Co., 124 N. J. L. 329, 12 A. (2d) 130 (1940).
'. E.g., Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 153 P. (2d) 573
(Calif. App. 1945); Shute's Case, 290 Mass. 393, 195 N. E. 354 (1935); Van
Kirk v. Hume-Sinclair, 226 Mo. App. 1137, 49 S. W. (2d) 631 (1932).
15 Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N. E. (2d) 328 (1940) ; 20 B. U. L. Rv.
586 (1940).
16 Ferrara's Case, 269 Mass. 243, 169 N. E. 137 (1929).
"7Mobile & Ohio R. R. v. Industrial Comm., 28 F. (2d) 228 (E. D. Ill. 1928);
Milton v. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 20 So. (2d) 570 (La. App. 1945); Eargle v. South
Carolina Elec. & Gas Co., 205 S. C. 432, 32 S. B. (2d) 240 (1945).
18 Shute's Case, 290 Mass. 393, 195 N. E. 354 (1935); Stone v. Blackmer &
Post Pipe Co., 224 Mo. App. 319, 27 S. W. (2d) 459 (1930).
19 Enterprise Dairy Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 202 Cal. 247, 259 Pac.
1099 (1927).
20 National Ice & Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 387 Ill. 31. 55 N. E. (2d) 91
(1944); Robinson's Case, 292 Mass. 543, 198 N. E. 760 (1935); City of Mus-
kogee v. Bebee. 193 Okla. 311, 142 P. (2d) 859 (1944).
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employee has been exposed to them to a greater degree than have mem-
bers of the general public. Application of the rule, however, is further
complicated by the lack of a satisfactory definition for the term "gen-
eral public." It cannot be agreed whether the term should include only
workmen, and if so whether it should include only those workmen en-
gaged in similar occupations or all workmen whether engaged in indoor
or outdoor activity. If the phrase is defined to embrace everyone in the
community, the further problem is encountered of ascertaining the ex-
tent of the community aind the general average of all those within it.
Some courts have tried to avoid the difficulty of determining what
injuries rise out of the employment by using a different criterion.2 3 In
Ciocca v. National Sugar Refining Company, 24 the New Jersey supreme
court found a method of avoiding this issue. An employee was overcome
with heat while sweeping sugar from the floor of an enclosed but well
ventilated dock. The temperature at the time was very high but there
was evidence that the dock was the coolest place in the vicinity. He was
exposed to neither the rays of the sun nor artificial heat, yet his widow
was awarded compensation merely because, the court said, the injury
was incident to the employment. The court thus obliterated for all prac-
tical purposes the requirement that the accident arise out of a risk in-
herent in the employment and left only the requisite that the injury be
suffered within the course of the employment. However desirable such a
result from the standpoint of definiteness and clarity, it can hardly be
justified under the wording of the present statutes requiring the injury to
arise out of the employment.
25
The Massachusetts supreme court, in Caswell's Case,26 applied still
a different standard. The claimant was injured when an unprecedented
storm lifted the roof from the building in which he was working, causing
a wall of the building to fall in on him. Compensation was awarded, the
court holding that compensation will be given whenever the injury re-
sults from physical contact with any object used in connection with the
employment. At first blush, the rule here announced, especially because
21 West v. Phillips, 227 Iowa 612, 288 N. W. 625 (1939); Smith v. Southern
Builders, 202 S. C. 88, 24 S. E. (2d) 109 (1943).
22 Wells v. Robinson Construction Co., 52 Idaho 562, 16 P. (2d) 1059 (1932);
Deckard v. Indiana University, 92 Ind. App. 192, 172 N. E. 547 (1930) ; Bauer's
Case, 314 Mass. 4, 49 N. E. (2d) 118 (1943).
23 Cf. Aetna Insurance Co. v. Industrial Comm., 81 Colo. 233, 254 Pac. 995
(1927); Harvey v. Caddo de Soto Cotton Oil Co., 199 La. 720, 6 So. (2d) 747
(1942), (1942) 17 TLANE L. REv. 147.
24 124 N. J. L. 329, 12 A. (2d) 130 (1940), (1940) 25 CORN. L. Q. 645.
25 Cf. Daugherty's Case, 238 Mass. 456, 131 N. W. 167 (1921); Lewis v. In-
dustrial Comm., 178 Wis. 449, 190 N. W. 101 (1922).
26 305 Mass. 500, 26 N. E. (2d) 328 (1940), (1940) 20 B. U. L. Rav. 586.
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of the facility with which it can be applied, seems to be desirable, but its
consistent application would produce unjust results. Carried to a logical
extreme, employees injured by direct contact with nature would be
denied compensation unless their employment exposed them to a pecul-
iar danger of injury from such sources, but an employee injured by the
same natural force occurring iridirectly by contact with some object
used in connection with the employment could recover. Because of this
incongruity, it is doubtful that this view will win wide acceptance.
In West Virginia, the cases have been uniform in holding that the
injury must arise out of the employment "' but here as elsewhere what
is meant by "arise out of" the employment is far from clear. In Collett
v. Compensation Commissioner,28 decedent was overcome with heat
while working in a rolling mill. The temperature outside the plant was
eighty degrees but the decedent, who was handling forty-pound packs
of white-hot metal, was exposed to a much greater heat. In allowing
recovery, it was held that heat exhaustion is compensable if it results
from special or particular risks or dangers attendant to the employ-
ment, to which the general public is not exposed. This rule was again
applied in Rasmus v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board,29 when
compensation was granted for the death from heat exhaustion of a
gasoline crane operator. While the temperature at the time of decedent's
death was high, the excessive heat was caused in part by the reflected
rays of the sun from piles of metal junk surrounding the crane and from
heat generated by the crane's engine. Hence it is to be noted that heat
exhaustion in this case as well as in the Collett case resulted from the
combination of a natural force with an artificial condition incident to
the employment.
When Keller v. State Compensation Commissioner"0 was decided
it seemed that the rule was being extended to embrace cases where in-
jury resulted solely from exposure to the natural elements. The decedent
suffered a sunstroke while driving spikes in repair of a railroad track
leading to the employer's plant. At the time he was overcome the tem-
perature in the vicinity had reached one hundred degrees, and evidence
showed that it was much hotter at the place where he was working than
elsewhere in the community, because of the reflected rays of the sun
from the steel rails and from a nearby building. It was held that the
27 Montgomery v. State Compensation Comm'r, 116 W. Va. 44, 178 S. E. 425
(1935); Mercer v. Compensation Comm'r, 78 W. Va. 629, 89 S. E. 952 (1916);
Archibald v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 448, 87 S. B. 791 (1916); De Francesco v. Piney
Mining Co., 76 W. Va. 756, 86 S. E. 777 (1915).
28116 W. Va. 213, 179 S. E. 657 (1935).
29 117 W. Va. 55, 184 S. E. 250 (1936).
80 125 W. Va. 185, 24 S. E. (2d) 81 (1942).
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case came within the rule of the Collett and Rasmus cases and that the
injury was therefore compensable. While arguably the reflected heat
was an artificial condition incident to the employment like the heat
from the white-hot metal in the Coll3tt case, and from the engine in the
Rasmus case, still the court did not indicate that decision rested upon
that theory. All the heat, direct and reflected, was generated by the sun's
rays, so it would appear that the court meant to allow recovery for death
caused by a natural force alone. Here, as in the earlier cases, the court
made necessary a showing that the risk from which the injury resulted
be greater to the workman because of his employment than to members
of the general public, and the general public was defined by the court
as consisting of all persons in the vicinity of the place of employment.
If the Keller case was authority for the proposition that compensa-
tion will be given for injuries caused by the natural elements when the
employee is exposed to a greater risk of injury from such source than
are other persons in the neighborhood, its authority was short lived. In
Williams v. State Compensation Commission,31 the decedent, while
working on a scaffold on the side of a building, lost consciousness and
died shortly afterwards. Compensation was claimed on the theory that,
since the decedent was more exposed to the sun's rays by reason of his
working on the building than was the general public, his death resulted
from a risk inherent in the employment and was therefore compensable.
While again expressing the general rule that the injury is compensable
if it results from a risk inherent in the employment, the court held the
risk to which the decedent was exposed was not of that nature. While
admitting that the facts in the Keller case were closely analogous to those
presented, the court merely states that the type of heat reflected from
steel rails was different enough from heat reflected from roofs to distin-
guish the two cases. Such a distinction would be difficult for a layman,
or indeed a lawyer, to comprehend.
Compensation should be allowed in either case when the injury
results from a risk inherent in the employment and greater than that to
which other persons in the community are exposed. 32 It would appear,
however, under the court's own definition of general public in the Wil-
liams case, that compensation would have to be denied whatever the
type of heat causing death. It is said that the injury must not only be
caused by some particular risk connected with the employment, but it
31 127 W. Va. 78, 31 S. E. (2d) 546 (1944).
32 Cf. National Ice & Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 387 Ill. 31, 55 N. E. (2d)
91 (1944); Bauer's Case, 314 Mass. 4, 49 N. E. (2d) 118 (1943); Stone v.
Blackmer & Post Pipe Co., 224 Mo. App. 319, 27 S. W. (2d) 459 (1930); Mus-
kogee v. Bebee, 193 Okla. 311, 142 P. (2d) 859 (1944); Eargle v. South Caro-
lina Elec. & Gas Co., 205 S. C. 432, 22 S. E. (2d) 240 (1945).
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must be beyond that to which those employed under substantially sim-
ilar conditions are subjected. Had this rule been applied in the Collett
case, the claimant would have been entitled to no compensation if other
men had been engaged with the decedent in handling the hot metal,
since he then would have been exposed to no risk beyond that to which
others employed under substantially similar conditions were subjected.
Likewise, in the Rasmus case, compensation under this rule would have
been denied if other persons had been employed to operate cranes under
circumstances substantially similar to those under which the decedent
operated his crane. The application of such a rule will greatly restrict the
number of injuries for which compensation is recoverable under our
statutes. To qualify for compensation in the future, it will be necessary to
show that the injured person was exposed to a risk in a degree that
affected him only. It no longer satisfies the statute to show that the in-
jury results from a risk incident to the employment and greater than
that to which the general average of persons in the community were sub-
jected. Judge Kenna, in a concurring opinion,3 strongly dissented from
the position taken by the majority that the phrase "general public"
should be confined only to those who are engaged in activities substan-
tially similar to those in which the injured employee was engaged. The
workmen's compensation statute, he says, should not be so construed as
to exclude employees who, while exposed to risks in no greater degree
than their fellow employees, are nevertheless exposed to a greater degree
than the general public in the same neighborhood. If our statute is to
provide any appreciable protection for workmen injured by natural
forces, a broader definition of "general public" than that adopted by
the majority in the Williams case must be formulated. Legislation im-
posing absolute liability upon employers for injuries to workmen which
are in any way related to the incidents of employment would immeasur-
ably facilitate administration of the compensation acts. This may per-
haps be the only solution to the perplexing problem of causation em-
bedded in the clause "arise out of" the employment.34 Until such legis-
lation is enacted, courts should strive to remedy the present unsatisfac-
tory status of the "general public" standard by carefully defining the
elements that constitute that standard, at the same time keeping in mind
3 See Williams v. State Compensation Comm'r, 127 W. Va. 78, 90, 31 S. E.(2d) 546, 552 (1944) (concurring on the ground that the record did not show
that the decedent was exposed to unusual heat).
34 Cf. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418 (1923) (indicating
that Fourteenth Amendment due process would be satisfied when the injury
relates in any way to an incident of the employment).
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the primary purpose of workmen's compensation acts to compensate
workmen for industrial injuries.3 5
C. W. W., JR.
35 Staton v. Reynolds, 58 F. Supp. 657 (W. D. Ky. 1945); Magma Copper
Co. v. Gonzales, 62 Ariz. 9, 152 P. (2d) 618 (1944); Paul v. Glidden Co., 114
Md. 309, 39 A. (2d) 544 (1944); United Air Lines Transport Corp. v. Indus-
trial Comm., 107 Utah 52, 151 P. (2d) 591 (1944); Eagle River Building &
Supply Co. v. Peck, 199 Wis. 192, 225 N. W. 690 (1929), (1930) 5 Wis. L. Riw.
381.
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